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Precht: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or the Modern Criminal at Work:

THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OR THE MODERN
CRIMINAL AT WORK:
THE DANGERS OF FACEBOOK FROM YOUR CUBICLE
Justin Precht

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the United States House of Representatives stated,
“Computers are rapidly becoming as much a part of American Life as
the telephone, automobile, typewriter or our everyday transaction at, for
instance, the supermarket.”1 Accordingly, legislation was needed to
address the “vast potential for significant criminal activity . . . because
the criminal justice system [was] ill-equipped to deal with th[e]
changing technology.”2 Congress responded by enacting the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) of 1986 in order to address security
concerns arising in conjunction with the rapid growth of computer use.
Section 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA criminalizes “exceeding
authorized access” in order “to obtain information from any protected
computer.”3 Currently, the circuit courts are split on what it means for
an individual to “exceed authorized access” in disputes between
employers and former employees arising under employee access
provisions of the CFAA.4
This Comment focuses on the circuit courts’ disagreement on what it
means to “exceed authorized access” in employer–employee disputes.
Part II examines the legislative history and purpose of the CFAA. Part
III examines circuit court decisions that have employed a broad
interpretation of the CFAA and the “exceeds authorized access”
language, and those decisions employing a narrow interpretation. Part
IV will provide an analysis of the varying interpretations and address
why the narrow interpretation should be adopted. Part V concludes this
Comment and suggests that the rule of lenity requires the narrow
interpretation, which more accurately reflects the legislative intent in
enacting the CFAA and adheres to principles of statutory interpretation
and Constitutional Due Process. The conclusion further argues that the
Legislature should amend the CFAA in order to promote certainty and
uniformity in the law.

1.
2.
3.
4.

H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 4 (1986).
Id. at 5.
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
See discussion infra Part III.
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II. BACKGROUND
Congress passed the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
(CCCA) of 1984.5 The CCCA made it a crime for a person to
“knowingly access a computer without authorization or having accessed
a computer with authorization, use[] the opportunity such access
provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend” in
order to knowingly use, modify, destroy, or disclose information in, or
prevent authorized use of, the computer.6 However, the CCCA limited
this offense to instances where the computer was under the control of
the federal government.7 Additionally, the CCCA stated that it was not
an offense to access a computer with authorization and to use “the
opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such access does
not extend, if the us[e] of such opportunity consists only of the use of
the computer.”8
Section 1030 of Title 18 of the United States Code was amended in
1986 to create the CFAA. Congress specifically cited that one of the
purposes for the amendment was to address a new breed of criminal
born out of recent technological advancements: “the technologically
sophisticated criminal who breaks into computerized data files.”9 The
amendment also addressed the lack of legislation regarding theft or
damage to computers, as federal enforcement previously relied on prior
legislation “designed for other offenses such as mail fraud (18 U.S.C.
1341) or wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343).”10 The 1986 amendment
remained limited to acts affecting federal government computers, but it
expanded the CFAA to make it a criminal offense to “knowingly access
a computer without authorization or to exceed authorized access.”11
The CFAA remained limited until Congress passed the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA). The EEA was created, in part, because
“[t]he United States produce[d] the vast majority of the intellectual
property in the world” and “[t]he value of the information [was] almost
entirely dependent on its being a closely held secret.”12
5. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 2101, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190-92 (1984).
6. Id. at 2190.
7. Id. at 2191. Section (a)(3) made it a crime where the computer “is operated for or on behalf
of the Government of the United States and such conduct affects such operation.”
8. Id.
9. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, supra note 1, at 3.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
12. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 6 (1996).
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This material is a prime target for theft precisely because it costs so much
to develop independently, because it is so valuable, and because there are
virtually no penalties for its theft. The information is pilfered by a variety
of people and organizations for a variety of reasons. A great deal of the
theft is committed by disgruntled individuals or employees who hope to
harm their former company or line their own pockets. In other instances,
outsiders target a company and systematically infiltrate the company then
steal its vital information. More disturbingly, there is considerable
evidence that foreign governments are using their espionage capabilities
13
against American companies.

At that time, federal law was insufficient to protect a company’s
valuable information and Congress acknowledged concerns with both
employee and outsider espionage. The reach of the CFAA was
expanded substantially by criminalizing the procurement of
“information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an
interstate or foreign communication.”14 Thus, by 1996 the CFAA
protected a company’s proprietary information and could be used in
actions by private employers against their employees. In short, the 1986
amendment was responsible for broadening the language of the statute
to cover instances where a person “exceeds authorized access,” and the
1996 amendment substantially broadened the scope beyond mere misuse
of government owned computers.15
The current CFAA, as amended in 2008, makes it a crime under
Section 1030(a)(2)(C) when an individual “intentionally accesses a
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access” to obtain
“information from any protected computer.”16 Similarly, Section
1030(a)(4) states that it is a crime when someone “knowingly and with
intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization,
or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the
intended fraud and obtains anything of value.”17 The CFAA defines
“exceeds authorized access” in Section 1030(e)(6) as accessing “a
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain
or alter.”18 Section 1030(g) allows an individual “who suffers damage
or loss” as a result of a violation to “maintain a civil action against the
violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other

13. Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
15. The CFAA was further amended in 2001 and 2002; however, these amendments did not
substantially alter the scope as to the provisions discussed in this Comment.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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equitable relief.”19
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The circuits are split on how to interpret the “exceeds authorized
access” language of the CFAA. The Seventh, Fifth, First, and Eleventh
Circuits have utilized a broad interpretation. The Seventh Circuit
employs an agency approach, while the Fifth, First, and Eleventh
Circuits limit authorized access to access authorized by the employer, so
an employee may have physical access to a computer, but is limited in
the ways he can use the information on that computer. The Ninth and
Fourth Circuits, utilizing the narrow interpretation, have limited
“exceeds authorized access” to activities synonymous with hacking.
A. Broad Interpretation of “Exceeds Authorized Access”
The Seventh Circuit addressed the CFAA’s “exceeds authorized
access” language in International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin. The
defendant was a former employee of International Airport Centers (IAC)
who, prior to quitting to start his own business, deleted all of the data on
the laptop that IAC had provided him, which included not only
information he had been collecting during the course of his employment
but also evidence of his improper conduct.20 The Seventh Circuit
applied agency principles and held the defendant breached his duty of
loyalty when he acted on interests that were adverse to those of his
employer, namely breaching his employment contract to pursue his own
business.21 The breach of the duty of loyalty “terminated his agency
relationship . . . and with it his authority to access the laptop, because
the only basis of his authority had been that relationship.”22 Thus, the
defendant “exceeded authorized access” when, no longer an agent of
IAC, he accessed the laptop in his possession and “used such access to
obtain or alter information in the computer” that he was “not entitled so
to obtain or alter.”23
The Seventh Circuit’s agency approach to “exceeding authorized
access” made little effort to determine the legislative intent behind the
CFAA or to provide a solid definition of “exceeds authorized access.”
Rather, the Seventh Circuit glossed over the “exceeds authorized
access” issue and transposed common law agency principles onto the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 420–21.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
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criminal statute to determine that an individual “exceeds authorized
access” whenever acting on an interest adverse to that of her employer.
The Fifth Circuit similarly advocated for a broad interpretation of
“exceeds authorized access.” However, counter to the Seventh Circuit’s
agency rationale, the Fifth Circuit held that “exceeding authorized
access” includes exceeding the purposes for which the employer
authorizes access.24 In United States v. John, the defendant was an
account manager at Citigroup who accessed seventy-six corporate
customer accounts and provided the information to her half-brother.25
Her half-brother and his accomplices then incurred fraudulent charges
on some of the accounts.26 The court stated that an employee could
“exceed authorized access” where the employee exceeds “the purposes
for which access has been given.”27 The court reasoned that John’s
access to Citigroup’s data was confined because “[s]he was not
authorized to access that information for any and all purposes but for
limited purposes.”28 The government had shown that “Citigroup’s
official policy, which was reiterated in training programs that John
attended, prohibited misuse of the company’s internal computer systems
and confidential customer information,” so John’s authorized access did
not extend to using the information to perpetuate fraud.29 Thus, under
the broad interpretation an employee violates the CFAA and exceeds his
authorized access on a protected computer through activities outside of
the scope of employer designated access.
The Fifth Circuit held that finding the CFAA to include authorized
data the employee did not have access to or information used in carrying
out a criminally fraudulent scheme would not in any way be surprising
to the defendant.30 This broad interpretation of the CFAA sets the level
of authorization only so far as the bounds authorized by an employer
and notes it is especially applicable where an employee is clearly part of
a fraudulent scheme.31 The rationale was that John knew she was aiding
in the commission of a crime and knew that she was “exceeding
authorized access” such that it would be fair to punish her under the
statute.
The First Circuit also held in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica,
Inc. that access in the “exceeds authorized access” language was to be

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 271–73.
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determined by the employer. Explorica was a competitor of EF Cultural
Travel BV (EF) in providing high school tours, and Explorica’s vice
president, Gormley, was a prior employee of EF.32 Explorica designed
and used a “scraper” program that focused solely on EF’s website and
would transfer its pricing information for tours back to Explorica.33 The
court held that Gormley exceeded authorized access where he entered
into a broad confidentiality agreement which “prohibit[ed the]
disclosure of any information ‘which might reasonably be construed to
be contrary to the interests of EF.’”34 In providing Explorica proprietary
information about the structure of EF’s website and its tour coding
system, Gormley exceeded his authorized access as defined by the
confidentiality agreement.35 Thus, the First Circuit held for the broad
interpretation and limited authorized access to authorization the
employer expressly allowed.
The Eleventh Circuit held that an employee had exceeded authorized
access when he accessed the personal records of seventeen individuals
for personal reasons in violation of company policy in United States v.
Rodriguez.36 Rodriguez worked as a TeleService representative for the
Social Security Administration (SSA) where he had access to social
security numbers, annual income, and other personal information.37
While employed, Rodriguez would look up women he had met or
knew.38 The court stated that, since the policy of the SSA only
authorized the use of the databases for business reasons, Rodriguez
“exceeded authorized access” when he began looking up women for
personal reasons.39 Therefore, the Rodriguez decision also linked
authorized access to that allowed under express company policy.
B. Narrow Interpretation of “Exceeds Authorized Access”
Other courts, led by the Ninth Circuit, have rejected the broad
interpretation and adhere to a narrow interpretation of the CFAA that
refuses to criminalize violations of employer computer use policies. In
32. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001).
33. Id. The Court noted that “[l]ike a robot, the scraper sought information through the Internet.
Unlike other robots, however, the scraper focused solely on EF’s website, using information that other
robots would not have. Specifically, [Explorica] utilized tour codes whose significance was not readily
understandable to the public. With the tour codes, the scraper accessed EF’s website repeatedly and
easily obtained pricing information for those specific tours.”
34. Id. at 583.
35. Id.
36. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).
37. Id. at 1260.
38. Id. at 1261–62.
39. Id. at 1263.
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LVRC Holdings L.L.C. v. Brekka, an employee at an addiction treatment
center accessed and emailed company records from his employee email
to his personal email.40 The Ninth Circuit began its analysis stating
“[t]he act was originally designed to target hackers who accessed
computers to steal information or to disrupt or destroy computer
functionality, as well as criminals who possessed the capacity to ‘access
and control high technology processes vital to our everyday lives.’”41
The court then rejected the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on agency
principles in Citrin, determining that the agency approach would mean
that an employee “exceeds authorized access” once his mental state
changes from loyal employee to disloyal competitor.”42
More
importantly, the court reasoned that since section 1030(a) of the CFAA
is primarily a criminal statute, “any ambiguity should be resolved in the
favor of lenity.”43
The rule of lenity “vindicates the fundamental principle that no
citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose
commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly
prescribed.”44 Thus, where an “employer has not rescinded the
defendant’s right to use the computer, the defendant would have no
reason to know that making personal use of the company computer in
breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer would constitute a
criminal violation of the CFAA.”45 The court held that a person
“exceeds authorized access” when the person uses a computer either
without permission to use the computer for any purpose, like a hacker,
or when the employer rescinds permission to access the computer.46 In
so holding, the court adopted the narrow interpretation of the “exceeds
authorized access” language in the CFAA.
A later Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Nosal, furthered the
narrow interpretation of the “exceeds authorized access” language in the
CFAA. The case wavered between the broad and narrow interpretations
as it wound its way through the system before the Ninth Circuit, sitting
en banc, concluded the narrow interpretation was correct. Nosal was an
employee at Korn/Ferry International (KFI), which provided executive
recruitment services.47 Nosal left to start a rival company, signed a
separation agreement, and agreed to serve as an independent contractor
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

LVRC Holdings L.L.C. v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1130 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-894, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3694 (July 24, 1984)).
Id. at 1134.
Id. (quoting United States v. Carr, 513 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.2008)).
Id. at 1134–35 (citing United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008)).
Id. at 1135.
Id.
United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *1 (N.D. Cal. April 13,

2009).
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to KFI for approximately one year.48 In the separation agreement Nosal
agreed not to compete with KFI in exchange for $25,000 per month as
well as two lump-sum payments.49 However, during this period Nosal,
along with two coworkers, obtained “source lists and other custom
reports of names and contact information from the KFI ‘Searcher’
database, a highly confidential and proprietary database of executives
and companies.”50
In 2009, the District Court for the Northern District of California
acknowledged both the broad and narrow interpretations of “exceeds
authorized access” before holding in favor of the broad interpretation.51
The district court noted that Congress had expanded the scope of the
CFAA since its enactment and that the rule of lenity was inapplicable
because the statute was not ambiguous.52 The court relied on the
Seventh Circuit’s use of agency principles in Citrin in holding that
Nosal had “exceeded authorized access” in accessing KFI’s database.53
However, driven by the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Brekka, decided
after the first Nosal decision, the district court granted reconsideration of
United States v. Nosal in 2010. In its reconsideration, the district court
followed Brekka and found that the broad interpretation was unworkable
where “the defendant would have no reason to know that making
personal use of the company computer against the employer’s interest
would constitute a criminal violation of the CFAA.”54 The district court
noted that the “Ninth Circuit held that authorization hinges on the
employer’s conduct—has the employer granted the employee
permission to access the computer?—not the employee’s state of mind
when accessing information or documents on the employer’s
computer.”55 The district court dismissed the CFAA charges and
remarked that there was “simply no way” to read the definition of
“exceeds authorized access” to include corporate computer-use
policies.56
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first focused on the text of the CFAA. It
noted that the statute defines “exceeds authorized access” to mean “to
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4–7.
Id. at *6–7.
Id.
Id. at *5 (quoting LVRC Holdings L.L.C. v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Id. (quoting Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133).
Id. at *7.
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obtain or alter.”57 The government argued, and the court accepted, that
the narrow interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” made “so”
superfluous in its definition.58 The court held that the proper
interpretation should be, “when the employee uses that authorized
access ‘to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is
not entitled [in that manner] to obtain or alter.’”59 The Ninth Circuit
emphasized that “[w]e decline to render meaningless a word duly
enacted by Congress.”60 After justifying the broad interpretation on the
statute’s plain language, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Brekka on its
absence of access restrictions. However, the court stated that “[o]ur
decision today that an employer’s use restrictions define whether an
employee ‘exceeds authorized access’ is simply an application of
Brekka’s reasoning.”61 The Ninth Circuit also looked to the decisions of
the Fifth Circuit in John, the Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez, and the First
Circuit in Explorica for support of its new position.62
This decision could have ended the circuit split on the “exceeds
authorized access” language and designated Brekka as applying only
when there was no employee policy in place. However, the Ninth
Circuit was not finished with this case and granted a rehearing en banc
in 2012. The court made clear that they were deciding between two
very different approaches to the CFAA:
This language can be read either of two ways: [f]irst, as Nosal suggests
and the district court held, it could refer to someone who’s authorized to
access only certain data or files but accesses unauthorized data or files—
what is colloquially known as “hacking.” For example, assume an
employee is permitted to access only product information on the
company’s computer but accesses customer data: [h]e would “exceed [ ]
authorized access” if he looks at the customer lists. Second, as the
government proposes, the language could refer to someone who has
unrestricted physical access to a computer, but is limited in the use to
which he can put the information. For example, an employee may be
authorized to access customer lists in order to do his job but not to send
63
them to a competitor.

The court then acknowledged, but rejected, the government’s statutory
57. United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2011).
58. Id. at 785.
59. Id. at 786–87.
60. Id. at 786 (citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“[O]ne of the most basic
interpretive canons [is] that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted)).
61. Id. at 787.
62. Id. at 788.
63. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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argument that “entitled” should be interpreted in line with the dictionary
definition of “to furnish with a right.”64 The court said the better
interpretation is to simply treat “entitled” as a synonym for
“authorized.”65 The Ninth Circuit then rejected the government’s “so”
argument because of concerns that adopting such a definition would
transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute to an expansive
misappropriation statute all because of a “two-letter word that is
essentially a conjunction.”66 The Circuit court stated that “[i]f Congress
meant to expand the scope of criminal liability to everyone who uses a
computer in violation of computer use restrictions—which may well
include everyone who uses a computer—we would expect it to use
language better suited to that purpose.”67 A major concern justifying the
court’s decision was the expansive scope of the broad interpretation.
The court acknowledged that Congress passed the initial version of
the CFAA in 1984 for the express purpose of combating hackers.68 The
government contended that because “without access” applies to hackers,
the “exceeds authorized access” provision must apply to people who
have authorized access but exceed it.69 The court stated that both
provisions could apply to hackers, “without access” for external hackers
and “exceeds authorized access” for internal hackers.70 The Ninth
Circuit expressed further concern in making criminals of people who
would have no idea they are committing a federal crime.71 The court
stated that “while ignorance of the law is no excuse, we can properly be
skeptical as to whether Congress, in 1984, meant to criminalize conduct
beyond that which is inherently wrongful, such as breaking into a
computer.”72
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s interpretation
because of its breadth in regards to subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), “which
[would] make[] it a crime to exceed authorized access of a computer
connected to the internet without any culpable intent.”73 Under “the
government’s proposed interpretation, millions of unsuspecting
individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal conduct.”74
Instead, the Ninth Circuit invoked common sense:
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 858.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 859.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Minds have wandered since the beginning of time and the computer gives
employees new ways to procrastinate, by g-chatting with friends, playing
games, shopping or watching sports highlights. Such activities are
routinely prohibited by many computer-use policies, although employees
are seldom disciplined for occasional use of work computers for personal
purposes. Nevertheless, under the broad interpretation of the CFAA,
such minor dalliances would become federal crimes. While it’s unlikely
that you’ll be prosecuted for watching Reason.TV on your work
computer, you could be. Employers wanting to rid themselves of
troublesome employees without following proper procedures could
threaten to report them to the FBI unless they quit. Ubiquitous, seldom75
prosecuted crimes invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

Therefore, in Nosal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Brekka’s core holding
and kept the circuit split alive by adopting the narrow interpretation of
the CFAA. The Ninth Circuit was clearly uncomfortable in expanding
the statute, originally designed to punish hacking, into one that could
potentially cover any employee conduct outside the scope of an
employer policy.
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in WEC Carolina Energy
Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller followed the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision
in Nosal. In Miller, an employee left WEC Carolina Energy Solutions,
Inc. (WEC) for its competitor Arc Energy Services, Inc. (Arc).76 Before
leaving, the employee downloaded and used WEC’s proprietary
information to make presentations to potential customers. The court
acknowledged that the “crux of the issue is the scope of . . . ‘exceeds
authorized access.’”77 The court followed Brekka and Nosal and held
that it must interpret the ambiguous statute using the rule of lenity. “[I]n
the interest of providing fair warning ‘of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed’ we will construe this criminal statute strictly and
avoid interpretations not ‘clearly warranted by the text.’”78 The court
also used the dictionary definition of access which meant “[t]o obtain,
acquire,” or “[t]o gain admission to.”79 The Fourth Circuit committed to
the narrow interpretation and clearly held: “we reject an interpretation of
the CFAA that imposes liability on employees who violate a use policy,
choosing instead to limit such liability to individuals who access
computers without authorization or who obtain or alter information
beyond the bounds of their authorized access.”80
Other courts are also following the Ninth Circuit’s lead in adopting
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 860.
WEC Carolina Energy Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 200 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 203.
Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 207.
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the narrow interpretation of the CFAA. For example, the District Court
for the Western District of Michigan decided Dana Ltd. v. American
Axle & Manufacture Holdings, Inc. in June 2012. The court noted that
“[t]he Sixth Circuit has not squarely addressed the meaning of ‘without
authorization’ or ‘exceeds authorized access’ in the context of departing
employees.”81 Yet, the court, reasoned that a prior Sixth Circuit
decision, which relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brekka,
suggested that the Sixth Circuit would likewise adopt the narrow view.82
The court acknowledged Nosal and other decisions of district courts
within the Sixth Circuit and concluded the “[c]ourt agrees with the
rationale of the district courts in this circuit, and joins these courts in
concluding that the terms ‘without authorization’ and ‘exceeds
authorized access’ in the CFAA must be given a narrow meaning.”83
IV. DISCUSSION
The narrow interpretation of the “exceeds authorized access”
language should be adopted for a number of reasons. First, the
legislative history of the CFAA indicates that Congress intended
“exceeds authorized access” to combat hacking. Second, the rule of
lenity requires any ambiguity to be resolved in favor of the party
accused of violating the law where the CFAA could potentially attach
criminal liability. Third, constitutional due process concerns support a
narrow interpretation of the statute. Finally, practicality and efficiency
dictate limiting the use of the criminal statute in employer–employee
disputes.
A. Congressional Intent
The House of Representatives Committee Report on the 1986 version
of the CFAA stated in a section titled “Need for Legislation:”
One somewhat unique aspect of computer crime is the expanding group
of electronic trespassers—the so called ‘hackers’ who have been
frequently glamorized by the media, perhaps because this image of the
hacker is that of a bright, intellectually curious, and rebellious youth—a
modern day Huck Finn. The fact is, these young thrill seekers are
trespassers, just as much as if they broke a window and crawled into a
home while the occupants were away. The Committee believes we
should attempt to deter and educate these youths in order to prevent our
81. Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-450, 2012 WL 2524008, at *4
(W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012).
82. Id.
83. Id. at *5.
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hacker of today from becoming our white-collar criminal of the future.

The legislative intent for the initial version of the CFAA was to combat
the rise of hackers. In fact, the Committee Report’s “Need for
Legislation” focused primarily on two themes with almost equal
recognition: the rapid growth of computer technology in everyday life
and hackers.85
The Senate Committee Report addressed the same concerns:
Th[e] technological explosion has made the computer a mainstay of our
communications system, and it has brought a great many benefits to the
government, to American businesses, and to all of our lives. But it has
also created a new type of criminal—one who uses computers to steal, to
defraud, and to abuse the property of others. The proliferation of
computers and computer data has spread before the nation’s criminals a
vast array of property that, in many cases, is wholly unprotected against
86
crime.

The Senate Report then noted a group of hackers known as the “414
Gang,” who had hacked the radiation treatment records of cancer
patients.87 The report stated, “the potentially life-threatening nature of
such mischief is a source of serious concern to the Committee.”88 The
Senate Report then acknowledged “pirate bulletin boards,” also
mentioned extensively in the House Report, which were a community
system of computers accessed via phone that had computer passwords
and other vital information.89 These concerns suggest that the
legislative intent behind the 1986 CFAA was to prevent harm caused by
the sophisticated hacker.
Furthermore, the 1996 EEA opened the CFAA beyond only those
offenses against United States government owned computers. This
version of the CFAA protected “information from any protected
computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign
communication.”90 The Senate Committee Report stated:
Only by adopting a national scheme to protect U.S. proprietary economic
information can we hope to maintain our industrial and economic edge
and thus safeguard our national security. Foremost, we believe that the
greatest benefit of the Federal statute will be as a powerful deterrent. In
addition, a Federal criminal law is needed because of the international
and interstate nature of this activity, because of the sophisticated
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, supra note 1, at 5–6.
Id. at 4–6.
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2 (1986).
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
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techniques used to steal proprietary economic information, and because
91
of the national implications of the theft.

The Report in its section titled “Increasing Incidents of Theft of
Proprietary Economic Information” noted that “computer
intrusions . . . account for the largest portion of economic and industrial
information lost by U.S. corporations. Most American companies are
poorly prepared to deal with these sophisticated and coordinated efforts
to obtain their proprietary economic information.”92 Thus, the 1996
Senate Report also focused clearly on international hackers’ access to
vulnerable information.
Furthermore, the 1996 Committee Report addressed the rise of
internal theft. One example the Report addressed was “an engineer for
an automobile air bag manufacturer who asked the company’s
competition for more than half a million dollars” for a “laundry list” of
“manufacturing designs, strategies, and plans.”93 Another was a
“former employee of two major computer companies” who stole “vital
information on the manufacture of microchips” and sold it “to China,
Cuba, and Iran.”94
All of the above Committee Reports addressed actions are covered by
the narrow interpretation of the CFAA’s “exceeds authorized access”
language. Clearly hacking and foreign and internal espionage represent
something more serious than actions that are merely beyond an express
employer computer use policy. The legislative history acknowledges
the threat of hacking and advanced espionage, but is lacking on actions
like deleting the information on a work laptop seen in Citrin or using a
work database to look at information for personal reasons in
Rodriguez.95
The legislative intent argument is not addressed in the circuit court
opinions adhering to the broad interpretation. However, legislative
intent is raised by the Fourth Circuit in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions:
Our conclusion here likely will disappoint employers hoping for a means
to rein in rogue employees. But we are unwilling to contravene
Congress’s intent by transforming a statute meant to target hackers into a
vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access computers or

91. S. REP. NO. 104-359, supra note 12, at 11–12.
92. Id. at 8.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 8–9.
95. See id. at 7–9; Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (an
employee who upon terminating his employment wiped his work laptop); and United States v.
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (a Social Security Administration employee who used
his work access to spy on female acquaintances).
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96

Likewise, the Ninth Circuit raised the issue in Nosal stating that the
“narrower interpretation” was “a more sensible reading of the text and
legislative history of a statute whose general purpose is to punish
hacking—the circumvention of technological access barriers—not
misappropriation of trade secrets—a subject Congress has dealt with
elsewhere.”97
The Committee Reports for the multiple amendments to the CFAA
support a narrow interpretation limited to hacking as seen in the Ninth
and Fourth Circuit cases. The legislative intent argument is compelling
because the 1986 Reports specifically mentioned hacking as a major
impetus for the legislation.98 Likewise, the 1996 Report focused on
foreign and internal espionage.99 There is some room for movement in
the legislative intent argument, since the Report does not give internal
espionage a clearly defined scope.100 However, the Report does provide
sufficiently egregious examples to differentiate the intent of the statute
from the broad holdings of the Seventh, Fifth, First, and Eleventh
Circuits.101
B. Rule of Lenity
Ambiguity concerning the scope of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity, meaning any doubts about an ambiguous
statute should be resolved in favor of the defendant.102 In United
States v. Bass the Supreme Court stated that the “choice has to be made
between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is
appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.”103
There are two principles behind the rule of lenity:
First, ‘a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
96. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012).
97. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
98. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, supra note 1, at 5–6; S. REP. NO. 99-432, supra note 86.
99. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-359, supra note 12.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Report notes an engineer who stole manufacturing designs and plans who sold the
information to company competition for half a million dollars; an employee for two major computer
companies who sold information to China, Cuba and Iran; and an employee who worked at a computer
firm that supplied software technology to various government projects like NASA who transmitted the
source code to another person.
102. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507
(2008).
103. Bass, 404 U.S. at 347 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
221–22 (1952)).
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common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain
line is passed. To make the warning fair, so fair as possible the line
should be clear.’ Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties,
and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define
104
criminal activity.

The rule of lenity is a strong argument for the narrow interpretation of
the CFAA statute for “exceeds authorized access.”105 The CFAA
attaches a criminal penalty where a person “intentionally accesses a
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and
thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer.”106 The
Fourth and Ninth Circuits first found the statute ambiguous by relying
on legislative intent and the plain meaning interpretation, and then
applied the rule of lenity as support for adopting the narrow
interpretation of the statute.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned:
The government’s construction of the statute would expand its scope far
beyond computer hacking to criminalize any unauthorized use of
information obtained from a computer. This would make criminals of
large groups of people who would have little reason to suspect they are
committing a federal crime. While ignorance of the law is no excuse, we
can properly be skeptical as to whether Congress, in 1984, meant to
criminalize conduct beyond that which is inherently wrongful, such as
107
breaking into a computer.

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that section 1030(a)(2)(C), the
section that primarily comes up in employee–employer disputes, is the
broadest subsection and “makes it a crime to exceed authorized access
of a computer connected to the Internet without any culpable intent.
Were we to adopt the government’s proposed interpretation, millions of
unsuspecting individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal
conduct.”108
The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that “employer–employee and
company–consumer relationships are traditionally governed by tort and
contract law,” and “the government’s proposed interpretation of the
104. Id. at 348 (citations omitted).
105. But see Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond WarGames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Should be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 405, 449 (2012)
(citing Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2423–24 (2006) (collecting cases))
(noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has increasingly watered down its formulation of the lenity rule,
applying it only in the face of ‘grievous ambiguity,’ or only if ‘after seizing everything from which aid
can be derived,’ the Court can make ‘no more than a guess as to what Congress intended’”).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
107. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
108. Id.
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CFAA allows private parties to manipulate their computer-use and
personnel policies so as to turn these relationships into ones policed by
the criminal law.”109 Furthermore, “[b]asing criminal liability on
violations of private computer use polices can transform whole
categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply
because a computer is involved.”110
The Fourth Circuit also applied the rule of lenity in adopting the
narrow interpretation of “exceeds authorized access:”
Thus, faced with the option of two interpretations, we yield to the rule of
lenity and choose the more obliging route . . . . Here, Congress has not
clearly criminalized obtaining or altering information “in a manner” that
is not authorized. Rather, it has simply criminalized obtaining or altering
111
information that an individual lacked authorization to obtain or alter.

The two circuits that adopted the narrow interpretation applied the rule
of lenity because the statute was ambiguous. One reason criminal
liability need not attach to the ambiguous statute, per the Fourth Circuit,
was because “nine other state-law causes of action potentially provide
relief, including conversion, tortious interference with contractual
relations, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation of trade secrets.”112
The rule of lenity is especially applicable where the potential criminal
liability subsumes so much seemingly innocuous daily activity.
C. Constitutional Due Process Concerns
A law may fail to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause
“if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to
the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide,
without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in
each particular case.”113 Thus, “[v]agueness may invalidate a criminal
law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide
the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what
conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”114
The broad interpretation of the CFAA’s “exceed authorized access”
language might violate both elements of the void-for-vagueness

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 860.
Id.
WEC Carolina Energy Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 207 n.4.
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966).
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).
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doctrine.115 It is highly unlikely that employees in the workforce are
aware they are potentially violating federal law when they spend a small
portion of their time at the office casually browsing the internet.
Whether or not such access would be considered a federal criminal
infraction would depend on the state and the employer’s acceptable use
policy. The CFAA, a criminal law, fails to provide adequate notice of
liability to otherwise reasonable, law-abiding citizens. “Significant
notice problems arise if we allow criminal liability to turn on the
vagaries of private polices that are lengthy, opaque, subject to change
and seldom read.”116 A criminal statute that includes seemingly
harmless, everyday activity is vague in that it surprises ordinary people.
In addition, the interpretation that relies on computer-use policy is
also likely overbroad, in that arbitrary enforcement necessarily follows a
statute that potentially criminalizes daily activity.117 The Ninth Circuit
in Nosal discussed United States v. Kozminski, in which the Supreme
Court refused to adopt the broad interpretation of a statute because it
would “criminalize a broad range of day-to-day activity.”118 In
Kozminski, the Court applied the rule of lenity and cautioned that the
broader statutory interpretation would “delegate to prosecutors and
juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type
of . . . activities are so morally reprehensible that they should be
punished as crimes,” subjecting individuals to discriminatory and
arbitrary enforcement.119 The broad interpretation of the CFAA is no
different. The government argued in Nosal that it would not prosecute
minor crimes under the broad interpretation of the CFAA.120 However,
such a concession acknowledges that the law would be so broad as to
cover activity which need not be considered criminal. A law, on the
books, which is enforced against some, but not others, at the discretion
of government actors is arbitrary.

115. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1561, 1562 (2010), stating “[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires courts to adopt narrow and
clear interpretations of unauthorized access to save the constitutionality of the statute. The CFAA has
become so broad, and computers so common, that expansive or uncertain interpretations of unauthorized
access will render it unconstitutional.”
116. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
117. See Cheryl Conner, Employees Really Do Waste Time at Work, FORBES.COM (July 17, 2012,
4:24 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2012/07/17/employees-really-do-wastetime-at-work (discussing a recent survey which estimated 64% of employees visited non-work related
websites at work).
118. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949 (1988).
119. Id.
120. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
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D. Practicality, Common Sense, and Court Resources
There are real world implications where employees could potentially
be held criminally liable for seemingly minor transgressions that occur
at work within the confines of one’s cubicle. It is only natural for an
employee in a nine-to-five career to take a break from his work. Prior to
the computer take-over of the office environment, employees may have
wasted time in extended meetings, making small talk with coworkers,
getting coffee, or talking on the phone. Now, with a computer at every
desk, while an employee may be using the Internet to check his bank
account or personal email, or pay his bills, or e-mail a friend, it is more
likely that he will be checking Facebook, Reddit, Tumblr, Twitter,
Pinterest, LinkedIn, Amazon, or any other number of social media
sites.121 Many employees are not transfixed solely on work for eight
straight hours, interrupted by a lunch at noon, when the wealth of
content on the internet is available by a click of the mouse. The Internet
may be the greatest source of distraction and it is ever so close. Some
studies show that breaks from work might even be productive, and
criminalization of productive activity should be discouraged.122
The Ninth Circuit addressed this argument in Nosal. Minds wonder,
and people procrastinate.123 We are not always perfect workers.
However, many computer use policies prohibit such temporary
excursions to one’s favorite website or activity that are unrelated to
work. Under the broad interpretation of the CFAA, attaching authorized
access only as far as the employer allows in its computer use policies,
these miniscule misdeeds would be classified as federal crimes. Also,
linking authorized access to employee computer use policies is
problematic because it will always be arbitrary. While it is not likely
that such a crime would be enforced, it is possible. The CFAA
interpretation that casts such a wide net to include common conduct in

121. Conner, supra note 117.
122. There are a number of studies on the subject and the conclusions differ, but some suggest
that breaks are a good thing. See Brief Diversions Vastly Improve Focus, Researchers Find,
SCIENCEDAILY (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/02/110208131529.htm
(noting that a new study “overturns a decades-old theory about the nature of attention and demonstrates
that even brief diversions from a task can dramatically improve one’s ability to focus on that task for
prolonged periods”). But see Adam Gorlick, Need a Study Break to Refresh? Maybe Not, Say Stanford
Researchers,
STANFORD
REPORT
(Oct.
14,
2010),
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2010/october/willpower-resource-study-101410.html (discussing a paper
published in Psychological Science by Stanford psychologists that found “a person’s mindset and
personal beliefs about willpower determine how long and how well they’ll be able to work on a tough
mental exercise”). See also Charlotte Fritz, Coffee Breaks Don’t Boost Productivity After All,
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (May 30, 2012), http://hbr.org/2012/05/coffee-breaks-dont-boostproductivity-after-all/ar/1.
123. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.
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the workplace is unworkable.124
Furthermore, the broad interpretation of the CFAA should also be
avoided because there are other causes of action for employer–employee
disputes. “The CFAA should not create liability in the employment
context that overlaps or preempts traditional causes of action applying to
employees. These tools include, among others, noncompete provisions,
trade secret protections, conspiracy, contract law, and the duty of
loyalty.”125
Employer–employee relationships are traditionally
governed by tort and contract law, and the government’s broad
interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” would allow employers to
manipulate their acceptable-use policies to turn the relationship into
ones policed by the criminal law.126 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
held that federal laws should only be read to interfere with the balance
of power between state and federal government only when the
congressional intent is unmistakably clear.127 The narrow interpretation
of the CFAA avoids unnecessary federal usurpation of causes of action
available to employers under state law.
A broad interpretation of the CFAA also has the potential to create
absurd results. Imposing criminal liability on computer use policy
means that “innocuous behavior” can be turned into a federal crime
“simply because a computer is involved.”128 For example, an employee
who brings a Sudoku book into work and solves puzzles during
downtime would be safe, but another employee who access
www.websudoku.com, in violation of an employer computer use policy,
is breaking federal criminal law.129 Likewise, reading a hard copy of
ESPN: The Magazine or The New York Times is safe, but visiting
www.espn.com or www.nyt.com is criminal.
Finally, the broad interpretation of the CFAA could waste scarce
124. Id. at 862 (discussing Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949, in which the Supreme Court refused to
adopt the broad interpretation of a statute because it would “criminalize a broad range of day-to-day
activity,” and warned that the broader statutory interpretation would “delegate to prosecutors and juries
the inherently legislative task of determining what type of . . . activities are so morally reprehensible that
they should be punished as crimes” and “subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory
prosecution and conviction”).
125. Garret D. Urban, Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current
Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1369, 1390 (2011).
126. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.
127. Urban, supra note 125, at 1390–91 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61
(1991)).
128. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.
129. Id. stating, “Employees who call family members from their work phones will become
criminals if they send an email instead. Employees can sneak in the sports section of the New York
Times to read at work, but they’d better not visit ESPN.com. And [S]udoku enthusiasts should stick to
the printed puzzles, because visiting www.dailysudoku.com from their work computers might give them
more than enough time to hone their [S]udoku skills behind bars.”
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federal judicial resources. The broad interpretation relies on computer
use policies, and any violation could be a potential federal crime. If all
of these crimes were pursued, the federal court system would be
inundated with causes of action under the CFAA.
V. CONCLUSION
The current circuit split concerning the CFAA’s “exceeds authorized
access” leads to confusion for lower courts. Furthermore, the differing
circuit court interpretations of the CFAA’s authorized access language
inhibit multistate employers’ ability to create and implement companywide comprehensive CFAA policies.130 The Seventh, Fifth, First, and
Eleventh Circuits have held that the plain language of the CFAA
supports a broad interpretation of the statute covering the “misuse or
misappropriation” of protected information.131 The Ninth and Fourth
Circuits have recently held that the CFAA is ambiguous as to what
employee conduct “exceeds authorized access” and that the rule of
lenity should be applied to limit the definition to conduct on par with
hacking, which coincides with the legislative intent.132 The narrow
interpretation of the CFAA’s statute is the correct one for employer–
employee disputes because the CFAA is a criminal statute and other
areas of law already cover the activity to which it ascribes criminal
liability. The broad interpretation of the statute casts the net much wider
than it need or should be.
In United States v. Nosal, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he
government assures us that, whatever the scope of the CFAA, it won’t
prosecute minor violations.”133 However, leaving an unduly broad
statute on the books is not the correct approach. The solution to the
ambiguity should come from either a legislative fix or for the Supreme
Court of the United States to grant certiorari on a relevant case to
resolve the dispute. A statutory fix, however, would be the superior
option because Congress is capable of amending and clarifying an
ambiguous statute. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick
Leahy had filed amendments to The Cybersecurity Act of 2012.134
130. Obie Okuh, Comment, When Circuit Breakers Trip: Resetting the CFAA to Combat Rogue
Employee Access, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 641 (2011).
131. See Int’l Airport Ctrs, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. John,
597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir.
2001); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).
132. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862; WEC Carolina Energy Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199,
200 (4th Cir. 2012).
133. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
134. Josh Smith, Cybersecurity Bill Hinges on Amendments, NATIONAL JOURNAL (July 30, 2012),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/cybersecurity-bill-hinges-on-amendments-20120730.
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These amendment would have satisfied the Department of Justice by
“enhancing the CFAA’s penalties, adding an asset forfeiture provision,
and creating a new extra-punitive 18 U.S.C. 1030A.”135 In exchange,
“Leahy’s Amendment would [have applied a] statutory fix to the
definition of ‘exceeds authorized access’ that essentially adopts the
narrow view of the circuit split on the scope of the CFAA.”136
However, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 was defeated in the Senate.137
If Congress is not able to amend the statute, the Supreme Court should
grant certiorari in order to provide clarity and guidance to the lower
courts.

135. Orin Kerr, Recent Developments–Both in the Court and in Congress–on the Scope of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 30, 2012, 11:35 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/30/recent-developments-both-in-the-courts-and-in-congress-on-thescope-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/#.ULw_fg1MgPw.email.
136. Id.
137. Tony Romm, Senate Cybersecurity Bid Sputters, POLITICO (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:54 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0812/79322.html.
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